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As a constitutional theorist, the late Judge Robert Bork was
best known for his advocacy of two major ideas: originalism and
judicial deference to the democratic process. In some cases, these
two commitments may be mutually reinforcing, as in Bork's cri-
tique of some of the nonoriginalist "activist" decisions of the
Warren Court.1 But Judge Bork largely failed to consider the
possibility that his two ideals sometimes contradict each other.
Over the last twenty to thirty years, it has become increasingly
clear that consistent adherence to originalism would often re-
quire judges to impose more constraints on democratic govern-
ment rather than fewer.
The tension between democracy and originalism is an im-
portant challenge for Bork's constitutional thought, as well as that
of other originalists who place a high value on democracy. We
could call the trade-off between the two the "Borkean dilemma."
While there are many different theories of democracy,2 for
present purposes I adopt a relatively simple definition under
which a law is democratically enacted if it is adopted by popular
vote or by representatives elected by the people.3 This simple
t Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. For helpful comments
and suggestions, I would like to thank Jack Balkin, Josh Blackman, Steven Calabresi,
and John McGinnis.
1 See, for example, Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduc-
tion of the Law 69-100 (Free Press 1990).
2 For a survey of several different normative theories of democratic participation,
see Ilya Somin, Democracy and Political Ignorance: Why Smaller Government is Smarter
38-61 (Stanford 2013).
3 For a discussion of some of the issues that arise when large portions of the popu-
lation are excluded from the suffrage, see Part III.
243
1
Somin: The Borkean Dilemma: Robert Bork and the Tension between Original
Published by Chicago Unbound, 2017
The University of Chicago Law Review Dialogue
definition seems to also be the one that Judge Bork implicitly re-
lied on in his writings.4
Part I of this Essay briefly outlines Bork's well-known com-
mitments to both originalism and judicial deference to the dem-
ocratic process. Part II discusses his failure to resolve the poten-
tial contradiction between the two. In Part III, I explain why the
tension between originalism and deference has become an in-
creasingly serious problem for originalists and briefly consider
some possible ways to resolve, or at least minimize, the contra-
diction. Some of these theories have potential, especially the
idea that many types of judicial review might actually promote
rather than undermine popular control of government. Ulti-
mately, however, none of them comes close to fully resolving the
conflict between originalism and democracy. The consistent
originalist will likely have to accept substantial constraints on
democracy. The consistent adherent of deference to the demo-
cratic process will have to reject judicial enforcement of major
parts of the original meaning of the Constitution.
I. ROBERT BORK'S Two GREAT COMMITMENTS
Throughout his writings on constitutional theory, Judge
Bork emphasized the imperatives of originalism and judicial re-
spect for the democratic process. In his early work on constitu-
tional law he defended the initially dominant original-intent
variant of originalism, which looked to the intentions of the
framers and ratifiers of the Constitution. In a well-known 1984
lecture, "Tradition and Morality in Constitutional Law," he stat-
ed that "the framers' intentions with respect to freedoms are the
sole legitimate premise from which constitutional analysis may
proceed."5 Like most other originalists, Bork later endorsed the
original meaning variant of the theory.6 In his influential 1990
4 See, for example, Bork, Tempting of America at 17 (cited in note 1) (referring to
legislation as "the democratic outcome").
5 Robert H. Bork, Tradition and Morality in Constitutional Law, in Robert H.
Bork, A Time to Speak: Selected Writing and Arguments 397, 403 (ISI Books 2008) (origi-
nally published 1984).
6 On the displacement of original intent by original meaning as the dominant
school of originalism, see, for example, Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Non-
originalists, 45 Loyola L Rev 611, 620-29 (1999). See also Ilya Somin, Originalism and
Political Ignorance, 97 Minn L Rev 625, 625-27 (2012) (citing numerous prominent
scholars and jurists who have endorsed original meaning); James E. Ryan, Laying Claim
to the Constitution: The Promise of New Textualism, 97 Va L Rev 1523, 1524-26 (2011)
(describing original meaning-which he refers to as "new textualism"-as the newly
dominant school of constitutional theory).
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book, The Tempting of America, he emphasized that originalists
should not "search ... for a subjective intention," but rather for
"what the public of that time would have understood the words
to mean."7 But he always insisted that originalism was superior
to any variant of living-constitution theory.8
At the same time, Bork also consistently emphasized the
need for judicial deference to democracy. In The Tempting of
America, he argued that "in wide areas of life majorities are en-
titled to rule, if they wish, simply because they are majorities."9
Earlier, he chastised living-constitution theorists for their "fun-
damental antipathy to democracy."10 One of his last books, Co-
ercing Virtue: The Worldwide Rule of Judges, is devoted to criti-
cizing what he called "the gradual replacement of democracy by
judicial rule" in the United States and other liberal democra-
cies.11 In his view, increasing judicial power is a threat to "[t]he
fundamental freedom recognized in democracies[,] the right of
the people to govern themselves." 12
In Bork's many extensive and insightful works on constitu-
tional theory, it is difficult to find indications that he saw much
tension between his commitment to originalism and his com-
mitment to democracy. To the contrary, he seems to have re-
garded the two as mutually reinforcing. In Tradition and Moral-
ity in Constitutional Law, Bork wrote that "[t]he original
Constitution was devoted primarily to the mechanisms of demo-
cratic choice. Constitutional scholarship today is dominated by
the creation of arguments that will encourage judges to thwart
democratic choice."13
Judge Bork did indicate some awareness of trade-offs be-
tween originalism and democracy when he wrote in 1971 that
the "Madisonian model" established by the Constitution as-
sumes that "[t]here are some things a majority should not do to
7 Bork, The Tempting of America at 144 (cited in note 1). In this book, Bork sug-
gested that his earlier writings defending original intent were in reality just a "short-
hand formulation" for original meaning. Id.
8 See, for example, id at 161-240; Bork, Tradition and Morality at 400-02 (cited in
note 5). See also Robert H. Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Con-
stitution, 1979 Wash UL Q 695.
9 Bork, The Tempting of America at 139 (cited in note 1).
10 Bork, Tradition and Morality at 402 (cited in note 5).
11 Robert H. Bork, Coercing Virtue: The Worldwide Rule of Judges 11 (AEI 2003).
12 Id at 11-12. For my review of this book, see Ilya Somin, Book Review, Democracy
& Judicial Review Revisited: The New Old Critique of Judicial Power, 7 Green Bag 2d
287 (2004).
13 Bork, Tradition and Morality at 402 (cited in note 5).
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us no matter how democratically it decides to do them." 14 But he
did not generalize this insight, perhaps because he also believed
that "[t]he makers of our Constitution ... provided wide powers
to representative assemblies and ruled only a few subjects off
limits by the Constitution."15 There need be no major conflict be-
tween democracy and originalism if the original meaning of the
Constitution mostly empowers majorities to do as they wish.
But such a tension can arise if the original meaning was in
fact designed to severely constrain the power of political majori-
ties. The Framers of the Constitution would have been surprised
at Bork's assertion that their handiwork was "devoted primarily
to the mechanisms of democratic choice."16 In reality, most of
them were very suspicious of democracy, which they sought to
constrain in numerous ways. They perceived democracy as dom-
inated by often-ignorant and easily misled voters, and as a
threat to individual rights, especially the right to private proper-
ty. 17 The framers of the Reconstruction Amendments were, in
some ways, even more suspicious of democracy than those of the
original Constitution. They sought to impose a wide range of
new constraints on political majorities at the state level, influ-
enced by the experience of majoritarian oppression of African
Americans, abolitionists, and others in the pre-Civil War period.18
II. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN DEMOCRACY AND ORIGINALISM
Judge Bork recognized that the Constitution was not a com-
pletely democratic document, since it protects "some areas of life
in which the individual must be free of majority rule."19 Recent
scholarship, however, has shown that the original meaning often
places much tighter constraints on democracy than Bork envi-
sioned. For example, Bork doubted that the incorporation of the
Bill of Rights against the states was consistent with original
14 Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind
L J 1, 3 (1971).
15 Bork, Tradition and Morality at 402 (cited in note 5).
16 Id.
17 On the Framers' fears that democracy would threaten property rights, see, for
example, Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutional-
ism: The Madisonian Framework and Its Legacy 5 (Chicago 1990).
18 For an extensive discussion of the anti-majoritarian origins of the Reconstruction
Amendments, see Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction 138-
62 (Yale 1998).
19 Bork, The Tempting of America at 139 (cited in note 1).
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meaning. 20 But evidence amassed by scholars such as Akhil Reed
Amar and Michael Kent Curtis strongly suggests that it was. 2 1
In Bork's words, incorporation of the Bill of Rights "enormously
expanded the [Supreme] Court's power" to curb majorities at the
state level.22 If incorporation is required by the original meaning,
it greatly exacerbates the tension between originalism and
democracy.
Similarly, Bork denounced both Lochner-era and modern
"substantive due process" as the epitome of judicial activism. 23
But there is in fact extensive evidence that the original meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment protected a wide range of sub-
stantive, unenumerated individual rights, including economic
liberties.24 There is even a possible originalist defense for the
Court's decision using the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as a rationale for Roe v Wade,25 the ultimate bte
noir of Bork and many other conservative originalists.26
In one of his most famous articles, Bork argued that the
original meaning of the First Amendment did not protect nonpo-
litical speech or symbolic expressive conduct that does not quali-
fy as speech in the narrow sense of the term. 27 But, as Eugene
Volokh has effectively demonstrated, the historical evidence
strongly suggests otherwise.28
Bork himself believed that the original meaning significant-
ly constrained democracy in another important way: by setting
tight restrictions on the scope of congressional power. He criti-
cized Wickard u Filburn29 and other New Deal decisions broadly
20 See id at 93-95.
21 See Amar, The Bill of Rights at 163-80 (cited in note 18); Michael Kent Curtis,
No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights 92-130 (Duke
1986).
22 Bork, The Tempting of America at 94 (cited in note 1).
23 See id at 36-49, 95-100, 110-28.
24 For extensive discussions of the evidence, see, for example, Bernard H. Siegan,
Economic Liberties and the Constitution 24-60 (Chicago 1980); David E. Bernstein, Re-
habilitating Lochner: Defending Individual Rights against Progressive Reform 8-11
(Chicago 2011); Timothy Sandefur, The Right to Earn a Living: Economic Freedom and
the Law 83-88, 90-96 (Cato 2010).
25 410 US 113 (1973).
26 See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 Const Commen 291,
311-19 (2007).
27 See Bork, 47 Ind L J at 20 (cited in note 14). See also Robert H. Bork, Slouching
towards Gomorrah: Modern Liberalism and American Decline 100-01 (ReganBooks
1996) (reiterating the view that the First Amendment does not protect "expressive" conduct).
28 See generally Eugene Volokh, Symbolic Expression and the Original Meaning of
the First Amendment, 97 Georgetown L J 1057 (2009).
29 317 US 111 (1942).
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interpreting Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause as
"a manifestation of judicial activism" at odds with originalism.30
Some other originalists agree. 31
In a 2002 article coauthored with Daniel Troy, Bork wrote
that judicial enforcement of the original meaning of Congress's
powers under the Commerce Clause "would require overturning
the New Deal, the Great Society, and almost all of the vast net-
work of federal legislation and regulation put in place in the last
two-thirds of the twentieth century."32 Bork and Troy recognized
that it would be unwise and politically impossible for the judici-
ary to actually attempt to do this.33 As they put it, "the reality is
that the New Deal is not going to be undone, certainly not by the
stroke of a judicial pen."34 But they nonetheless urged the Court
to at least partially enforce the original meaning, and thereby
strike down some types of federal legislation in several fields,
including criminal law, transportation, and environmental law.35
To the extent that Bork and Troy did not advocate going further
than this, it is in part because they were willing to sacrifice ad-
herence to originalism in favor of other values, such as practical-
ity. Even on Bork's own interpretation of the Constitution,
therefore, judicial enforcement of the original meaning would
require invalidating a large amount of modern federal legisla-
tion.
All of the above examples of conflict between originalism
and democracy are contestable.36 Perhaps some of them are
simply incorrect interpretations of the original meaning. But if
any substantial number of them are correct, there is a serious
potential conflict between Bork's commitment to democracy and
his commitment to judicial enforcement of the original meaning.
Bork's own work does not include any systematic attempt to
reconcile the two. But I suspect that his answer to the dilemma
30 Bork, The Tempting of America at 56 (cited in note 1).
31 See, for example, Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce
Clause, 68 U Chi L Rev 101, 111-30 (2001).
32 Robert H. Bork and Daniel E. Troy, Locating the Boundaries: The Scope of Con-
gress's Power to Regulate Commerce, 25 Harv J L & Pub Pol 849, 851 (2002).
33 See id at 851-52, 883-84.
34 Id at 883-84.
35 See id at 884-93.
36 See, for example, Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of
the Fourteenth Amendment 134-56 (Harvard 1977) (arguing that incorporation of the
Bill of Rights goes against the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment); Jack M.
Balkin, Commerce, 109 Mich L Rev 1, 15-29 (2010) (arguing for a broad interpretation of
the original meaning of the Commerce Clause).
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might have been to argue that judicial enforcement of the origi-
nal meaning does not go against democracy because the original
meaning is itself the result of democratic decision making. As
Bork put it in 1971, by enacting a constitution, "[s]ociety [itself]
consents to be ruled undemocratically within defined areas by
certain enduring principles believed to be stated in, and placed
beyond the reach of majorities by, the Constitution."37 In 1984,
he asserted that "[i]n a constitutional democracy the moral con-
tent of law must be given by the morality of the framer or the
legislator," and the "sole task" of judges is to "translate the
framer's or the legislator's morality into a rule to govern unfore-
seen circumstances."38 Although Bork did not explicitly draw the
connection, it is potentially possible to square judicial enforce-
ment of the Framers' view of the Constitution with deference to
democracy by claiming that the Framers' view was itself enacted
by a democratic process.
Unfortunately, this solution to the Borkean dilemma is vul-
nerable to well-known objections. Perhaps the most significant
is that the original meaning of the most important parts of the
Constitution-the original Constitution of 1787, the Bill of
Rights of 1791, and the Reconstruction Amendments of the
1860s-was not adopted by a process that would be considered
democratic under any modern definition of the term. The politi-
cal processes of 1787, 1791, and the 1860s excluded virtually all
women, and also the vast majority of African Americans-
cumulatively well over half of the adult population.39 Critics of
originalism, such as Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall,
have emphasized this history of exclusion as an important strike
against originalism.40
But even if the original meaning were the product of a de-
liberative process that was fully democratic and representative
in its own time, it is not clear why democratic principles justify
enforcing it against the will of today's political majorities, centu-
ries later. To be sure, this problem arises any time a democrati-
cally enacted law purports to bind people at a time later than its
original adoption. A law enacted yesterday may no longer enjoy
37 Bork, 47 Ind L J at 3 (cited in note 14).
38 Bork, Tradition and Morality at 403 (cited in note 5).
39 For a rare and skillful attempt to grapple with this problem from an originalist
point of view, see John 0. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the
Good Constitution 100-15 (Harvard 2013).
40 See Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Con-
stitution, 101 Harv L Rev 1, 2 (1987).
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majority support today.41 But the dilemma is far more severe in
the case of the original meaning of the US Constitution, which is
one of the oldest and most difficult-to-amend constitutions in the
world. Because it is both old and difficult to change, the original
meaning of our Constitution is more likely to fall out of align-
ment with the will of present-day majorities than is either ordi-
nary statutory law or a more recently enacted or easier to
change constitution.
Thomas Jefferson famously claimed that, because "the earth
belongs ... to the living," constitutions should be scrapped every
nineteen years, to ensure that no generation's autonomy is con-
stricted by the decisions of long-dead ancestors. 42 We need not go
nearly so far to wonder whether an extremely difficult-to-amend
constitution enacted-however democratically-centuries ago,
can be considered meaningfully democratic today.
In sum, therefore, Bork's commitment to democracy and his
commitment to judicial enforcement of originalism are not easily
reconciled. A judiciary that consistently enforces the original
meaning is likely to severely constrain the power of modern po-
litical majorities. And that constraint is not easy to justify on
the grounds that the original meaning is itself the product of
democratic processes.
III. CAN THE BORKEAN DILEMMA BE RESOLVED?
The conflict between democracy and originalism is deep and
serious. It is a problem not just for Bork's theory, but for any
theory of originalism that seeks to combine judicial enforcement
of a centuries-old original meaning with a strong commitment to
democracy in the here and now. There are, however, several po-
tential ways of eliminating, or at least diminishing, the tension
between the two values. Here, I consider three particularly sig-
nificant ones. Each of these approaches has some potential. But,
ultimately, none can fully resolve the conflict between original-
ism and democracy.
The most obvious way to reconcile democracy and originalist
judicial review is to argue that enforcement of the original
meaning actually promotes democracy rather than detracts from
it -not because the original meaning was democratically enacted,
41 For a discussion of this issue, see generally Jed Rubenfeld, Freedom and Time: A
Theory of Constitutional Self-Government (Yale 2001).
42 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Feb 6, 1789), in Merrill D. Pe-
terson, ed, The Portable Thomas Jefferson 444, 445 (Viking 1975).
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but because adherence to it has "representation-reinforcing" ef-
fects.43 Representation-reinforcing judicial review-an idea de-
veloped by the late John Hart Ely-occurs in situations where
judicial invalidation of statutes or executive actions actually
promotes democratic political participation rather than inhibits
it. Obvious examples include judicial protection of freedom of
speech, the right to vote, and the right to form political parties.
While Ely himself was a nonoriginalist, his idea can be
adapted to justify enforcement of the original meaning of various
parts of the Constitution. In principle, it can be used to justify
judicial enforcement of aspects of the Constitution that initially
seem remote from political participation. Ely used it to justify
protection of racial, religious, and ethnic minorities against var-
ious types of discrimination, even in cases where it did not di-
rectly deprive them of the ability to participate in the political
process. 44 I myself have argued that judicial enforcement of fed-
eralism-based constraints on congressional power is representa-
tion reinforcing because it increases citizens' opportunities to
"vote with their feet" between jurisdictions with divergent poli-
cies, and "foot voting" is often a more effective way of achieving
political accountability than conventional ballot box voting.45
Judicial review of federalism might also be representation rein-
forcing because it facilitates the representation of a more diverse
set of popular preferences than a one-size-fits-all federal gov-
ernment approach to the policy issue at hand.46
One could potentially develop representation-reinforcement
rationales for enforcing the original meaning of other parts of
the Constitution as well. Many such theories are, of course, like-
ly to evoke disagreement, and may be subject to serious objec-
tions. But even if we push such ideas as far as they can reasona-
bly go, it seems unlikely that representation-reinforcement can
be stretched far enough to cover all, or even most, elements of
the original meaning. It is particularly hard to apply it to the
protection of substantive individual rights far removed from
43 This term comes from John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judi-
cial Review 101-02 (Harvard 1980).
44 See id at 135-79.
45 See Somin, Democracy and Political Ignorance at 165-69 (cited in note 2); Ilya
Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective on
the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 Iowa L Rev 1287, 1344-50 (2004).
46 See, for example, Michael W. McConnell, Book Review, Federalism: Evaluating
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political representation, such as rights to privacy, rights to non-
political speech or practice of religion, the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishments," and others.47
Another possible approach is to adopt Professor John 0.
McGinnis and Professor Michael B. Rappaport's argument that
the original meaning should generally be enforced because it is
the product of supermajoritarian decision-making processes,
which are likely to yield rules superior to those produced by ei-
ther judges applying living-constitution theories or legislatures
adopting laws through the ordinary political process.48 A com-
plete examination of their fascinating theory is beyond the scope
of this Essay.
For now, however, it is important to emphasize that McGin-
nis and Rappaport support these supermajoritarian outcomes
not because they are necessarily democratic in nature, but be-
cause they are likely to yield welfare-maximizing rules that pro-
vide greater utilitarian benefits for the bulk of the population
than other approaches to constitutional interpretation would.49
Moreover, as McGinnis and Rappaport recognize, the superma-
joritarian decision-making processes that produced most of the
Constitution were not necessarily democratic by modern stand-
ards, since much of the adult population was excluded from par-
ticipation.50 Even if they were democratic in their own time, us-
ing the rules generated by long-dead people in the distant past
would still end up curbing the democratic discretion of present
majorities. Thus, the McGinnis-Rappaport theory is ultimately a
new justification for using the original meaning to constrain the
democratic process, not a way of dissolving the tension between
democracy and originalism.
A third possible way to reconcile originalism and democracy
would be for judges to defer heavily to the elected branches' in-
terpretation of the Constitution and invalidate laws only if the
conflict between them and the Constitution's original meaning is
unusually glaring and impossible to reconcile. Something like
this is implied by the "presumption of constitutionality" that the
47 Ely did, however, try to extend his theory to cover some of these rights. See, for
example, Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 173-76 (cited in note 43) (advancing a repre-
sentation-reinforcement rationale for judicial enforcement of the Eighth Amendment).
48 See McGinnis and Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution at 19-99
(cited in note 39).
49 See id at 23-24.
50 See id at 100-15.
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Supreme Court sometimes applies to federal statutes.51 But the
presumption would have to be much stronger than it is in cur-
rent jurisprudence if courts are to avoid invalidating numerous
laws as violations of the original meaning. For example, an in-
fluential 1893 article by James Bradley Thayer claimed that
judges should only invalidate a law if its unconstitutionality is
"not open to rational question."52
Such "Thayerian" deference would end up greatly undermin-
ing judicial enforcement of the original meaning. Particularly in
an era when Congress often fails to take constitutional issues
seriously,53 a super-strong presumption of constitutionality
would effectively license the legislative branch to ignore the
original meaning whenever it becomes politically convenient to
do so.
Even when Congress does give serious consideration to pos-
sible constitutional objections to proposed legislation, it may not
address the issue from an originalist perspective. Like judges,
members of Congress who focus on constitutional issues are not
necessarily originalists. Even when they consider constitutional
issues in good faith, they could easily give nonoriginalist theo-
ries greater weight than the original meaning. For these rea-
sons, a super-strong presumption of constitutionality is more a
way of subordinating originalism to democracy than a way of
reconciling the two.
Ultimately, we cannot completely dissolve the Borkean di-
lemma, or even come close to doing so. Democracy and original-
ism are not fully compatible. There will be many cases where we
must prioritize one of these commitments over the other.
51 See, for example, United States u Morrison, 529 US 598, 607 (2000) (noting that
a "presumption of constitutionality" applies in cases involving judicial review of federal
statutes).
52 James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitu-
tional Law, 7 Harv L Rev 129, 144 (1893). For a recent history and evaluation of Thayer-
ian deference, see Richard A Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100
Cal L Rev 519, 522-37 (2012).
53 For good discussions of the reasons why Congress often gives short shrift to con-
stitutional questions, see generally Neal Devins, Why Congress Did Not Think about the
Constitution When Enacting the Affordable Care Act, 106 Nw U L Rev Colloquy 261
(2012); Neal Devins, Party Polarization and Congressional Committee Consideration of
Constitutional Questions, 105 Nw U L Rev 737 (2011).
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CONCLUSION
Judge Bork's failure to squarely address the conflict be-
tween democracy and originalism is perhaps an understandable
oversight. When he was at the height of his career as a constitu-
tional theorist in the 1970s and 1980s, many of the most promi-
nent constitutional conflicts of the era involved efforts by liber-
als to overturn conservative laws on the basis of constitutional
arguments that usually relied on nonoriginalist theories of in-
terpretation. Warren and Burger Court decisions protecting pri-
vacy rights,54 abortion,55 and the rights of criminal defendants6
were paradigmatic examples of this trend, though many of these
decisions have since attracted originalist defenders.57 In that
context, it was, perhaps, easy for conservative originalists to
downplay or overlook potential conflicts between their theories
and deference to the democratic process.
But, as far back as the 1970s and early 1980s, conservative
and libertarian jurists and legal scholars were already arguing
for stronger judicial protection of economic liberties and proper-
ty rights on originalist grounds.58 In two important opinions
written in the 1970s, conservative Justice William Rehnquist
argued that the text and original meaning of the Constitution
justified stronger judicial intervention to protect federalism and
property rights.59
54 See for example, Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965).
55 See Roe v Wade, 410 US 113 (1973).
56 See for example, Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966) (expanding criminal de-
fendants' rights against police interrogations); Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335 (1963)
(requiring states to provide counsel for indigent criminal defendants); Escobedo U Illi-
nois, 378 US 478 (1964) (holding that criminal suspects have a right to counsel during
police interrogations); Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 (1963) (holding that withholding of
"material" evidence from a criminal defendant violates his due process rights).
57 See, for example, Amar, The Bill of Rights at 231-83 (cited in note 18) (providing
an originalist rationale for the Warren Court's application of most of the Bill of Rights to
the states); Balkin, 24 Const Commen at 311-28 (cited in note 26) (defending Roe v Wade
on originalist grounds).
58 For an important pathbreaking work along these lines, see Siegan, Economic
Liberties and the Constitution at 318-31 (cited in note 24).
59 See, for example, National League of Cities u Usery, 426 US 833, 844-45 (1976)
(relying, in part, on originalist reasoning to enforce Tenth Amendment federalism limita-
tions on congressional power), overruled by Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, 469 US 528 (1985); Penn Central Transportation Co v New York City, 438 US
104, 141-42 (1978) (Rehnquist dissenting) (arguing that the Court's failure to provide
stronger protection for property owners against regulatory takings violated the text of
the Fifth Amendment in "a very literal sense"). For a discussion of early conservative
and libertarian efforts to strengthen judicial protection for property rights, see generally
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In recent years, conservatives and libertarians have ad-
vanced a variety of arguments challenging numerous state and
federal laws on originalist grounds-the most famous recent ex-
ample being the challenge to the individual health insurance
mandate of the Affordable Care Act,60 which the five conserva-
tive justices on the Court concluded was not authorized by the
original meaning of the Commerce Clause and the Necessary
and Proper Clause.61 Conservative and libertarian originalists
also led the successful effort to persuade the Supreme Court to
recognize an individual right to bear arms under the Second
Amendment and apply it against the states. 62
Today, intellectually honest originalists of any political
stripe have little choice but to confront the tension between de-
mocracy and judicial enforcement of the original meaning direct-
ly. In doing so, they will have to at least partially subordinate
one of these goals to the other.
Some originalists have already embraced the idea that con-
sistent enforcement of the original meaning requires substantial
restrictions on democracy, and indeed consider this a virtue of
their theory rather than a defect. For example, Randy Barnett
argues that judicial enforcement of tight constraints on govern-
ment power-including that wielded by democratic majorities-
enhances the legitimacy of government and prevents unjustified
oppression.63 Others might prefer to sacrifice originalism rather
than democracy when the two conflict. There is also room for
various intermediate positions, under which originalism might
trump democracy in some situations, but yield to it in others.
But regardless of where we ultimately come down on it, the
Borkean dilemma cannot be evaded. In a wide range of cases,
originalism and democracy are enemies, not friends.
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